Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting
http://www.100md.com
《新英格兰医药杂志》
David B. Resnik begins Owning the Genome with a disclaimer: he considers himself to be a professor of philosophy and ethics, not an attorney or legal scholar. Resnik is noticeably more self-assured in chapters devoted to ethical arguments about DNA patents than in background chapters on scientific and legal issues. He addresses both deontological arguments (DNA patents are inherently moral or immoral) and consequentialist arguments (DNA patents are moral or immoral because of their consequences), but it is the consequentialist arguments, both pro and con, that Resnik ultimately thinks matter. Faced with uncertainty about the likely consequences of DNA patents, he cautions against either maintaining the status quo or banning DNA patents outright, and he instead proposes limitations on patent rights to minimize the risk of harm. The result is a book that is more likely to satisfy readers who are predisposed to find DNA patents morally acceptable than it is to change the minds of readers who have grave moral reservations.
Resnik sets aside the argument that it is inherently immoral to patent nature by declaring it irrelevant to the practice of patenting DNA, noting that patents may not be obtained on "DNA in its natural state," but only on "invented DNA" that has been isolated and purified or otherwise modified through human intervention. He dismisses the argument that DNA patents commodify nature and thereby violate the dignity, value, or sanctity of the natural world by drawing an analogy to other practices that are generally thought to be morally acceptable, such as ownership of land and animals and patenting of other biological materials.
Resnik finds the argument that DNA patents violate human dignity inconclusive, invoking Immanuel Kant's distinction between complete and incomplete commodification of the body. Complete commodification necessarily violates human dignity and is inherently immoral, whereas incomplete commodification merely threatens human dignity and may be permissible in the exercise of moral judgment to fulfill another duty, such as the duty to save life or advance science. A patent on a whole human being, or even on a whole human genome, would be inherently immoral according to this analysis. But DNA patents typically cover only parts of a human genome, not the whole thing, and only artificial parts, not natural ones, and thus constitute only incomplete commodification of the human body. Resnik therefore concludes that DNA patents do not inherently violate human dignity but merely threaten it — and, as such, may be condemned as immoral only by virtue of their consequences.
Turning to this consequentialist analysis, Resnik credits DNA patents with a key role in the development of the biotechnology industry, which invests billions in research and development, creates thousands of high-paying jobs, and pays billions in taxes. Such patents, he asserts, have already had measurable benefits for science, medicine, and agriculture, although it may take years to realize the full benefits. He also recognizes costs of DNA patents that need to be weighed in the balance, including plausible threats to scientific progress, to medicine, and to agriculture. Ultimately, however, Resnik concludes that there is more evidence to support the benefits and that the threats would therefore be better managed by fine-tuning the patent system than by banning DNA patents entirely.
Readers whose intuitions differ from those of Resnik might be inclined to quarrel with his treatment of the mixed and inconclusive evidence about the consequences of DNA patents. In contrast, readers who believe in the practical value of DNA patents, yet have nagging moral reservations about them, may find his careful parsing of the issues helpful. To Resnik's credit, he recognizes that the consequences of DNA patents raise empirical questions that will not be definitively resolved for many years.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, J.D.
University of Michigan Law School
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
rse@umich.edu(By David B. Resnik. 235 p)
Resnik sets aside the argument that it is inherently immoral to patent nature by declaring it irrelevant to the practice of patenting DNA, noting that patents may not be obtained on "DNA in its natural state," but only on "invented DNA" that has been isolated and purified or otherwise modified through human intervention. He dismisses the argument that DNA patents commodify nature and thereby violate the dignity, value, or sanctity of the natural world by drawing an analogy to other practices that are generally thought to be morally acceptable, such as ownership of land and animals and patenting of other biological materials.
Resnik finds the argument that DNA patents violate human dignity inconclusive, invoking Immanuel Kant's distinction between complete and incomplete commodification of the body. Complete commodification necessarily violates human dignity and is inherently immoral, whereas incomplete commodification merely threatens human dignity and may be permissible in the exercise of moral judgment to fulfill another duty, such as the duty to save life or advance science. A patent on a whole human being, or even on a whole human genome, would be inherently immoral according to this analysis. But DNA patents typically cover only parts of a human genome, not the whole thing, and only artificial parts, not natural ones, and thus constitute only incomplete commodification of the human body. Resnik therefore concludes that DNA patents do not inherently violate human dignity but merely threaten it — and, as such, may be condemned as immoral only by virtue of their consequences.
Turning to this consequentialist analysis, Resnik credits DNA patents with a key role in the development of the biotechnology industry, which invests billions in research and development, creates thousands of high-paying jobs, and pays billions in taxes. Such patents, he asserts, have already had measurable benefits for science, medicine, and agriculture, although it may take years to realize the full benefits. He also recognizes costs of DNA patents that need to be weighed in the balance, including plausible threats to scientific progress, to medicine, and to agriculture. Ultimately, however, Resnik concludes that there is more evidence to support the benefits and that the threats would therefore be better managed by fine-tuning the patent system than by banning DNA patents entirely.
Readers whose intuitions differ from those of Resnik might be inclined to quarrel with his treatment of the mixed and inconclusive evidence about the consequences of DNA patents. In contrast, readers who believe in the practical value of DNA patents, yet have nagging moral reservations about them, may find his careful parsing of the issues helpful. To Resnik's credit, he recognizes that the consequences of DNA patents raise empirical questions that will not be definitively resolved for many years.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, J.D.
University of Michigan Law School
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
rse@umich.edu(By David B. Resnik. 235 p)