Hostile Use of the Life Sciences
http://www.100md.com
《新英格兰医药杂志》
All technological advancements — from knives and forks to airplanes and rockets — have been exploited for destructive ends. Inherent in every scientific discovery is the "dual use" dilemma: the same science that enables the sequencing of a new virus as part of a search for a cure also enables the manufacture of deadlier viruses.
The anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 jolted us out of complacency. Traditional restraints — such as taboos surrounding the use of poison and disease as weapons, as well as international conventions including the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention — cannot guarantee our security. It is not only bioresearch with strictly malign applications that is concerning: ostensibly neutral, but potentially lethal, knowledge can fall into the wrong hands.
Given the accidental creation of a lethal strain of mousepox virus in 2001, the synthesis of poliovirus in 2002, and the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus in 2005, the genie is clearly out of the bottle. Reactions from the scientific community have ranged from severe criticism to high praise. As Sir Solly Zuckerman, former chief scientific advisor to the British government, wrote in 1970, "When one talks about social responsibility of scientists, it is carrying naiveté to the extreme to suppose that they speak with one voice and that they share a common conscience when it comes to the application of scientific knowledge."
After the anthrax scare of 2001, the U.S. government quietly withdrew from public release more than 6600 technical documents dealing mainly with the production of germ and chemical weapons.1 In a 2003 report, the National Research Council acknowledged the risk that dangerous agents used in research could be "stolen or diverted for malevolent purposes" and that "research results, knowledge or techniques could facilitate the creation of . . . entirely new classes of threat agents." It recommended, however, steering clear of major research restrictions and creating instead a new level of federal review for proposed experiments that pose particular biosecurity risks. The delineation of these categories of experiments and related government efforts are discussed by Steinbrook in this issue of the Journal (pages 2212–2214).
In addition, the White House asked the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) to limit potentially dangerous information in the 11 journals it publishes. The reaction of the scientific community was predictable: in 2003, 32 of the world's leading journal editors and scientist-authors issued a statement affirming that academic freedom is the lifeblood of academic science. The document, which grew out of a workshop sponsored by the National Academies of Science and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pledged that editors and scientists would act responsibly without government intervention and that their journals would constrain potentially harmful information.
There are limits, however, to self-regulation. In 1985, the ASM published a "Code of Ethics" regarding biologic weapons. But its simple statement that microbiologists should "discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind" left a good deal open to interpretation. Furthermore, in a globalized world, no one country can single-handedly ensure biosafety.
The establishment of an international code of conduct for life scientists to minimize threats from biologic weapons has gathered momentum in the past few years. The agenda for the next review process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, due in 2006, specifically includes "the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists." So far, however, the functions of such a code have been poorly defined, and little has been offered by way of specific contents or methods of promulgation and implementation.2
But the primary limitation of ethical codes is they are unenforceable. History has shown that they can be overridden by "higher" considerations, such as a sense of patriotism. For example, Dr. Ishii Shiro, head of the notorious Japanese Biochemical Warfare Unit 731 during World War II, famously pleaded with his fellow doctors: "Our God-given mission as doctors is to challenge all varieties of disease-causing microorganisms. . . . However, the research upon which we are now about to embark is the complete opposite of these principles. Nevertheless, I beseech you to pursue this research based on the double medical thrill; one, as a scientist to exert effort to probing for the truth in natural science and research into, and discovery of, the unknown world, and two, as a military person, to successfully build a powerful military weapon against the enemy."3
Joshua Lederberg, who received the Nobel Prize in 1958 for his work in bacterial genetics, was correct in concluding that "There is no technical solution to the problem of biological weapons. It needs an ethical, human and moral solution if it's going to happen at all."
The near impossibility of eliminating the risk does not mean we should do nothing. In 2004, the British Medical Association (BMA), sounded a warning,4 urging scientists to be aware of their work's effects on legal and ethical norms that prohibit the development and use of biologic weapons and to engage in discussion with funders about prohibiting certain types of research. The BMA further urged states to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to demonstrate that they have met their obligations under the convention, and to pass legislation to implement its requirements. Finally, the BMA recommended that countries support the appeal issued in 2002 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, calling on governments, life scientists, and biotechnologists to foster a culture of responsibility that is coherent with current developments in scientific ethics and existing law.5Ultimately, I believe what is called for is an international plan that entails legally binding control of access to dangerous pathogens, transparency for sanctioned biodefense programs, assistance to developing countries in advancing biosafety and biosecurity, and development of a global ethic of compliance.
For millennia, humans have engaged in an invisible interspecies war with microbes. At the same time, countless internecine, intraspecies wars have stained our history. If we fail to exercise responsible stewardship over the life sciences, human beings may not survive into the third millennium — though microbes almost certainly will.
Source Information
Dr. Lim is an associate professor in the Department of Community, Occupational, and Family Medicine, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
References
Broad WJ. U.S. is tightening rules on keeping scientific secrets. New York Times. February 17, 2002:1.
Pearson GS, Dando MR. Strengthening the biological weapons convention. Briefing paper no. 13. 2nd series. Towards a life sciences code: countering the threats from biological weapons. Bradford, United Kingdom: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 2004.
Ryohei S. Bacteriological warfare. Sunday Mainichi. January 27, 1952.
Dando M. Biotechnology, weapons and humanity II. London: British Medical Association, 2004.
Coupland R, Leins KR. Science and prohibited weapons. Science 2005;308:1841-1841.(Meng-Kin Lim, M.B., B.S.,)
The anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 jolted us out of complacency. Traditional restraints — such as taboos surrounding the use of poison and disease as weapons, as well as international conventions including the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention — cannot guarantee our security. It is not only bioresearch with strictly malign applications that is concerning: ostensibly neutral, but potentially lethal, knowledge can fall into the wrong hands.
Given the accidental creation of a lethal strain of mousepox virus in 2001, the synthesis of poliovirus in 2002, and the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus in 2005, the genie is clearly out of the bottle. Reactions from the scientific community have ranged from severe criticism to high praise. As Sir Solly Zuckerman, former chief scientific advisor to the British government, wrote in 1970, "When one talks about social responsibility of scientists, it is carrying naiveté to the extreme to suppose that they speak with one voice and that they share a common conscience when it comes to the application of scientific knowledge."
After the anthrax scare of 2001, the U.S. government quietly withdrew from public release more than 6600 technical documents dealing mainly with the production of germ and chemical weapons.1 In a 2003 report, the National Research Council acknowledged the risk that dangerous agents used in research could be "stolen or diverted for malevolent purposes" and that "research results, knowledge or techniques could facilitate the creation of . . . entirely new classes of threat agents." It recommended, however, steering clear of major research restrictions and creating instead a new level of federal review for proposed experiments that pose particular biosecurity risks. The delineation of these categories of experiments and related government efforts are discussed by Steinbrook in this issue of the Journal (pages 2212–2214).
In addition, the White House asked the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) to limit potentially dangerous information in the 11 journals it publishes. The reaction of the scientific community was predictable: in 2003, 32 of the world's leading journal editors and scientist-authors issued a statement affirming that academic freedom is the lifeblood of academic science. The document, which grew out of a workshop sponsored by the National Academies of Science and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pledged that editors and scientists would act responsibly without government intervention and that their journals would constrain potentially harmful information.
There are limits, however, to self-regulation. In 1985, the ASM published a "Code of Ethics" regarding biologic weapons. But its simple statement that microbiologists should "discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind" left a good deal open to interpretation. Furthermore, in a globalized world, no one country can single-handedly ensure biosafety.
The establishment of an international code of conduct for life scientists to minimize threats from biologic weapons has gathered momentum in the past few years. The agenda for the next review process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, due in 2006, specifically includes "the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists." So far, however, the functions of such a code have been poorly defined, and little has been offered by way of specific contents or methods of promulgation and implementation.2
But the primary limitation of ethical codes is they are unenforceable. History has shown that they can be overridden by "higher" considerations, such as a sense of patriotism. For example, Dr. Ishii Shiro, head of the notorious Japanese Biochemical Warfare Unit 731 during World War II, famously pleaded with his fellow doctors: "Our God-given mission as doctors is to challenge all varieties of disease-causing microorganisms. . . . However, the research upon which we are now about to embark is the complete opposite of these principles. Nevertheless, I beseech you to pursue this research based on the double medical thrill; one, as a scientist to exert effort to probing for the truth in natural science and research into, and discovery of, the unknown world, and two, as a military person, to successfully build a powerful military weapon against the enemy."3
Joshua Lederberg, who received the Nobel Prize in 1958 for his work in bacterial genetics, was correct in concluding that "There is no technical solution to the problem of biological weapons. It needs an ethical, human and moral solution if it's going to happen at all."
The near impossibility of eliminating the risk does not mean we should do nothing. In 2004, the British Medical Association (BMA), sounded a warning,4 urging scientists to be aware of their work's effects on legal and ethical norms that prohibit the development and use of biologic weapons and to engage in discussion with funders about prohibiting certain types of research. The BMA further urged states to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to demonstrate that they have met their obligations under the convention, and to pass legislation to implement its requirements. Finally, the BMA recommended that countries support the appeal issued in 2002 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, calling on governments, life scientists, and biotechnologists to foster a culture of responsibility that is coherent with current developments in scientific ethics and existing law.5Ultimately, I believe what is called for is an international plan that entails legally binding control of access to dangerous pathogens, transparency for sanctioned biodefense programs, assistance to developing countries in advancing biosafety and biosecurity, and development of a global ethic of compliance.
For millennia, humans have engaged in an invisible interspecies war with microbes. At the same time, countless internecine, intraspecies wars have stained our history. If we fail to exercise responsible stewardship over the life sciences, human beings may not survive into the third millennium — though microbes almost certainly will.
Source Information
Dr. Lim is an associate professor in the Department of Community, Occupational, and Family Medicine, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
References
Broad WJ. U.S. is tightening rules on keeping scientific secrets. New York Times. February 17, 2002:1.
Pearson GS, Dando MR. Strengthening the biological weapons convention. Briefing paper no. 13. 2nd series. Towards a life sciences code: countering the threats from biological weapons. Bradford, United Kingdom: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 2004.
Ryohei S. Bacteriological warfare. Sunday Mainichi. January 27, 1952.
Dando M. Biotechnology, weapons and humanity II. London: British Medical Association, 2004.
Coupland R, Leins KR. Science and prohibited weapons. Science 2005;308:1841-1841.(Meng-Kin Lim, M.B., B.S.,)